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06 — RECOVER

Objective

Restore affected services in a trustworthy state, communicate honestly during restoration, and convert every incident into institutional learning.

Core capabilities

ID Capability Description
RC-1 Recovery planning Documented recovery plans for crown-jewel services with RTO/RPO targets agreed with the business; restoration ordering based on dependencies (from IDENTIFY).
RC-2 Trusted restoration Verify integrity of backups and systems before reconnecting (assume ransomware persistence); rebuild-from-known-good procedures; credential rotation as standard recovery step.
RC-3 Recovery execution & verification Ability to execute restores at scale; post-restore validation that services function and are clean.
RC-4 Recovery communication Status communication to internal stakeholders, customers, authorities (final NIS2/DORA reports), and the public where relevant (CSF 2.0 RC.CO).
RC-5 Lessons learned & improvement loop Blameless post-incident reviews with tracked actions; findings feed the improvement backlog (CSF 2.0 ID.IM) and update playbooks, detections and controls.
RC-6 Business continuity integration CDC recovery plans aligned with enterprise BCM/DR; joint exercises.

CIA mapping

Capability C I A Rationale
RC-1 Recovery planning RTO/RPO are Availability commitments.
RC-2 Trusted restoration Restoring a backdoored system restores the breach: Integrity verification before Availability restoration is the core principle of this function.
RC-4 Communication Recovery comms must not leak sensitive investigation details (Confidentiality of incident data).

Roles & staffing

  • Service/platform owners execute restoration; the CDC verifies cleanliness.
  • Incident manager remains accountable until closure criteria are met.
  • BCM coordinator — interface to continuity management.

Maturity criteria

Level Criteria
1 — Initial Restoration improvised; backups untested; no post-incident reviews.
2 — Managed Recovery plans and RTO/RPO for critical services; annual restore test; post-incident reviews held for major incidents.
3 — Established Rebuild-from-known-good procedures; integrity verification gates before reconnection; lessons-learned actions tracked to closure; joint BCM/CDC exercise annually.
4 — Optimising Recovery time capabilities measured against RTO in realistic exercises (incl. ransomware-scale scenarios); improvement loop metrics show incidents driving control changes; supplier recovery dependencies tested.

EU regulatory hooks

  • NIS2 Art. 21(2)(c) — business continuity, backup management, disaster recovery, and crisis management are explicitly required measures.
  • NIS2 Art. 23 — the final report (≤ 1 month) must include root cause, mitigation, and cross-border impact where applicable.
  • DORA Art. 11–12 — response and recovery plans, backup policies and restoration procedures for financial entities, with testing obligations.
  • GDPR Art. 32(1)(c) — "the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner" is a named legal requirement.

External dependencies

Dependency Party Type Agree up front
RTO/RPO targets accepted Business service owners [GATE] Signed per crown jewel; revisited after exercises
Restoration execution Service/platform owners [HARD] Rebuild procedures rehearsed jointly
Reconnection of restored systems CDC integrity verification [GATE] Cleanliness criteria checklist; CDC sign-off before reconnect
Business continuity alignment and joint exercises BCM function [HARD] Shared scenario set; annual joint exercise
Supplier recovery dependencies Vendors / procurement [SOFT] Recovery commitments in contracts where feasible

Sources

  • NIST CSF 2.0 (CSWP 29), RECOVER function. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.29
  • NIST SP 800-34 Rev. 1, Contingency Planning Guide for Federal Information Systems.
  • Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) Art. 21(2)(c), 23; Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) Art. 11–12; GDPR Art. 32.

Open CDC Framework (OCDF) — CC BY 4.0. Credits: 19-references.md.